First of all, the increase in Fianna Fails Bertie Ahearn in 1997 appeared to be a return to increased support for the more maximalist demands of Sinn Fein and SDLP, although Ahearn took steps to reassure trade unionists.54 This more traditional fiannaine approach was reflected in the draft agreement presented by Blair and Ahearn at the Peace Conference in the final decisive days of negotiation. which was strongly oriented towards the nationalists` insistence on strong and quasi-independent north-south institutions. The presentation of this project almost failed. However, in the face of the revolt of trade unionists, Ahearn agreed, against the advice of his accomplices, to radically water down these provisions in order to reach a trade union agreement – a decision that led some to nominate Ahearn as an additional candidate for the “indispensable actor”55 But this trial decision cost its price. Given that the process has resulted in a consocative agreement that protects the rights of both communities, but the fight against many of the underlying causes of conflict (for example). B police work, economic equality, etc.), peace remains fragile, sectarian tensions remain high and the institutions created by the agreement are barely operational, at best113.113 These concerns were expressed by many civil society participants during the negotiations113. as is. but their voices have been marginalized in favour of the priority that has been given to leaving men with arms. One of the main obstacles to Sinn Fein`s inclusion in the peace process has been the nature of its links with the IRA, the paramilitary organisation responsible for most of the attacks on British and Ulster security forces and loyalist paramilitaries, as well as a series of high-profile attacks in England, including an aborted attack on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher , who killed one of his accomplices. The exact nature of the relationship between the two groups has been (and will remain) highly controversial, both ahead of the agreement and ahead of its implementation. Sinn Fein leaders have always insisted that they are separated and that Sinn Fein cannot speak for the IRA.31 To some extent, this was a kind of denial that the IRA had to give the flexibility to explore what Sinn Fein could use as an “extract” to explore the possible outcomes of the negotiations without effectively forcing the IRA to accept the political path.32 In the same time , there is good reason to believe that Sinn Fein`s leadership did not have sufficient influence within the IRA in the decisive moments to achieve the IRA`s preferred results, particularly on the issue of the IRA dismantling its weapons.33 to exclude the verdict that it was a familiar round of negotiation intended to convince the other parties (unionists). Dublin, London and Washington), that Sinn Fein had reached the end of its flexibility.

Коментарите са затворени.